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ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE OF COMPARABLE
SALES TO DETERMINE MARKET VALUE
OF URBAN RENEWAL PROPERTY
Today, as never before, government at all levels must continually
cope with the unparalleled problems of urban redevelopment. Since
the large-scale acquisition of properties within an urban renewal
project area has a substantial impact on the local real estate market,
one such difficulty is the valuation of property to be acquired by an
urban renewal agency. Community Redevelopment Agency v. Hender-
son, considered the extent to which prices paid for comparable prop-
erty can be used as evidence to establish the value of property to be
acquired in an urban renewal project area. In Henderson, the prop-
erty that was acquired was located on South Bunker Hill Street, three
hundred feet south of Third Street, in the Bunker Hill redevelopment
project in Los Angeles. The Los Angeles Civic Center is located di-
rectly north of First Street, the northern boundary of the renewal
project; the downtown Los Angeles business area is located directly
south of Fourth Street, the southern boundary of the project. To the
west of the project area runs the Harbor Freeway, serving as a natural
barrier for a residential neighborhood located to the west of the
Freeway.
The property of the condemnee was zoned residential at the time of
trial, but the renewal plan contemplated its redevelopment for com-
mercial purposes, and a commercial rezoning was anticipated.2 Two
experts testifying for the condemnee estimated the value of the prop-
erty at $225,000. 3 These experts relied upon comparable sales for
1. 251 Cal. App. 2d 336, 59 Cal. Rptr. 311 (1967).
2. The Los Angeles business area directly south of the project was zoned and
developed commercially. This area was expanding in several directions, including
northward into the project area. The Henderson case considers the possibility
of a zoning change, but states correctly that the future use of the land is not evi-
dence of market value, and that the condemnee is not entitled to the value thereof.
However, the almost certain probability of a zoning change should have some
effect on the court's application of its discretionary power to admit or exclude
evidence of comparable sales.
3. The experts place the value at $225,000 ($24.80 per square foot) and $227,-
000 ($25.00 per square foot) respectively. Community Redevelopment Agency v.
Henderson, 251 Cal. App. 2d 336, 340, 59 Cal. Rptr. 311, 312 (1967) [herein-
after cited as CRA v. Henderson].
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their valuations. All of the comparable sales used by them were in
the downtown business area, except for one which was located adjacent
to the redevelopment project. These comparables were all zoned
heavy commercial. All but one of the sales4 were excluded by the
trial court because the property was not
... sufficiently alike in respect to character, situation, usability,
and improvements, to make it clear that the two tracts are com-
parable in value and that the price realized for the other land
may fairly be considered as shedding light on the value of the land
in question.5
The expert witness for the renewal authority relied upon compar-
able sales of residential properties, all west of the Harbor Freeway,
and fixed a value which was approximately one-third of the value ar-
rived at by condemnee's experts.8 His value was accepted by the jury,
and the Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict of the trial court. In ex-
plaining the exclusion of all but one of condemnee's comparables, the
Court of Appeals stated that condemnee's other sales were south of
the project area and within the central business area. Such sales were
excluded because of their commercial zoning, because of the improve-
ments existing upon them, because of their location, and because they
were located on through streets. Condemnee's property was located
on a street three or four blocks in length. The importance of location
to the decision on comparability is critical. While condemnee's com-
parables were within the business area, condemnee's property after its
renewal was to be an integral part of the downtown area, located in
the redevelopment project between the Civic Center and the central
business district. The Court indicated that the renewal authority's
comparables were admissible because they were unimproved proper-
ties zoned residential, as was condemnee's land.
I. THE CALIFORNIA APPROACH
Over objection by the condemnee,7 the Court of Appeals held that
the admissibility of evidence concerning the sale of similar property as
4. The one sale of condemnee admitted into evidence was the sale of the
parking lot adjacent to the renewal project. Id. at 340, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 312.
5. County of Los Angeles v. Faus, 48 Cal. 2d 672, 678, 312 P.2d 680, 684
(1957).
6. The expert for the renewal authority valued the property at $72,500 ($8.00
per square foot). CRA v. Henderson, 251 Cal. App. 2d 336, 340, 59 Cal. Rptr.
311, 313 (1967).
7. Id. at 340-41, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 313-14.
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a method of determining market value is a matter resting solely
within the discretion of the trial court. This rule was first adopted
in California in County of Los Angeles v. Faus.8 The criteria listed
for similarity in comparable sales in Faus are threefold:
1) the comparable sale must be similar in character, situation,
usability, and improvements;
2) the comparable sale must have occurred sufficiently close in
time and in location to the sale in question; and
3) the comparable sale must be voluntary, between a willing seller
and a willing buyer.,
In the present case, because of a California statute, size must also be
included as a factor affecting comparability.'0 A reading of the Cali-
fornia cases on the subject leads to the conclusion that the trial court
could have excluded the evidence of defendant's comparables without
having abused its discretion.- The question is whether or not the
evidence should have been excluded by the trial court. Remember
that a jury is not bound by the evidence if it is admitted, and may
even choose not to consider it in fixing compensation. People ex rel.
Department of Public Works v. University Hill Foundation,12 a case
that follows Faus, held that evidence of comparables should be ad-
mitted if there is some foundation for it. The court then continued:
"The weight to be given it was a factual question for the jury to deter-
mine." This view concurs with the general view in California that
the discretion of the trial court should be liberally exercised in ad-
mitting evidence of comparable sales, rather than restrictively as in
the Henderson case.' 4 Another method of dealing with the problem
is stated in People ex rel. Department of Public Works v. Wasser-
man.15 Here the trial court restrictively exercised its discretion to ex-
clude sales considered involuntary. The appellate court stated:
8. 48 Cal. 2d 672, 312 P.2d 680 (1957).
9. Id. at 678, 312 P.2d at 684.
10. CAL. Evw. CODE § 816 (Deering 1967).
11. People ex reL. State Park Comm'n v. Johnson, 203 Cal. App. 2d 712, 22
Cal. Rptr. 149 (1962); City of San Diego v. Boggeln, 164 Cal. App. 2d 1, 330
P.2d 74 (1958); People ex reL. Dep't of Public Works v. Murata, 161 Cal. App.
2d 369, 326 P.2d 947 (1958).
12. 188 Cal. App. 2d 327, 10 Cal. Rptr. 437 (1961).
13. Id. at 332, 10 Cal. Rptr. at 440.
14. People ex rel. Dep't of Public Works v. Auburn Ski Club, 241 Cal. App. 2d
781, 50 Cal. Rptr. 859 (1966); People ex rel. Dep't of Public Works v. Wasser-
man, 240 Cal. App. 2d 716, 50 Cal. Rptr. 95 (1966); People ex rel. Dep't of
Public Works v. University Hill Foundation, 188 Cal. App. 2d 327, 10 Cal. Rptr.
437 (1961).
15. 240 Cal. App. 2d 716, 50 Cal. Rptr. 95 (1966).
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:. . that evidence of comparable sales is properly received if the
judge, in the exercise of a wide discretion, is satisfied that the price
was sufficiently voluntary to be a reasonable index of value.16
California cases 17 follow a restrictive policy when there is evidence
that the comparable sale was not voluntary, but they have not usually
extended this restrictive policy to exclude comparables because of their
characteristics. In the present case, the condemnee was forced to use
the sales he did use, due to the fact that there had been no voluntary
sales within the project area, except to the renewal agency, since
1957.18 The court relied on the differences in the comparables used
by the condemnee without considering the fact that he had to go to
sales somewhat dissimilar because of the unavailability of a market
within the redevelopment project. The fact remains, however, that
the comparables used by the condemnee resulted from voluntary
sales, and their voluntary character was not questioned by the court.
A California case decided one year before Henderson illustrates
an excellent way in which the problem comparables can be resolved in
difficult cases. People ex rel. Department of Public Works v. Auburn
Ski Club19 involved the condemnation of the ski dub's land. Speaking
about the property, the court said, "The condemned property was
unique in character and none of the sales used by either side as
'comparables' bore a too-close similarity to it."20 Nevertheless, the
court allowed two sales to be admitted into evidence, saying in part,
[b]ecause of the peculiar circumstances described above-the sui
generis character of the subject property and impossibility of ob-
taining other market data-these considered in the light of the
quite considerable areas in which the properties compared possess
common features with the subject property, we share the trial
court's opinion that the sales permitted to be used would have
been helpful to the jury in fixing just compensation and were
therefore properly admitted.-
The Auburn case indicates that where actual comparables are not
available, and other data is lacking, sales of property comparable in
16. Id. at 738-39, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 109-10.
17. People ex rel. Dep't of Public Works v. University Hill Foundation, 188
Cal. App. 2d 327, 332, 10 Cal. Rptr. 437, 440 (1961); County of San Mateo v.
Bartole, 184 Cal. App. 2d 422, 439, 7 Cal. Rptr. 569, 580 (1960).
18. CRA v. Henderson, 251 Cal. App. 2d 336, 340, 59 Cal. Rptr. 311, 312
(1967).
19. 241 Cal. App. 2d 781, 50 Cal. Rptr. 859 (1966).
20. Id. at 784, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
21. Id. at 785, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
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some but not all respects will be allowed in as evidence, even though
their use may be limited.
The Henderson case would seem to present a similar problem. The
only sale presented by the condemnee and admitted by the court was
one which occurred adjacent to the redevelopment project. All of the
renewal authority's comparable sales, which formed the basis for the
valuation of the property, occurred quite some distance from the
redevelopment project, and west of the Harbor Freeway.22 Their lo-
cation was such that they were separated by a large barrier, the Free-
way, from the area to be affected by the project. It is difficult to see
how the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, could admit the
renewal authority's group of sales and exclude the condemnee's when
both groups appear to vary from the Faus criteria. The point was
made that the sales offered by the condemnee differed in the price
paid for them from $46 per square foot to $159 per square foot, yet
condemnee's experts valued the property in question at only $25 per
square foot. That the experts did not put the same value upon con-
demnee's property as the comparable sales they were offering into
evidence to determine the value of that property does not mean the
sales were of no use as evidence to determine market value. The
Henderson court itself talked about the great variation in property
value in the area around the project.23 The property in question is of
a unique character when compared with the sales offered as compar-
ables. To allow one group of questionable comparables, not limiting
their use as evidence in any way, while excluding another group of
questionable comparables would seem to be an unwise exercise of the
discretion granted the trial court, if not an abuse. The court would
have been wiser to take the position of the Auburn or the University
Hill Foundation court.
II. CRMQUE
Because of the wide discretion granted the trial court in these
situations,24 Henderson cannot be said to be a wrong decision. But
22. The Henderson case gives the locations of all of the condemnee's compar-
ables. The case also states that condemnor's comparables were west of the Harbor
Freeway.
23. CRA v. Henderson, 251 Cal. App. 2d 336, 343, 59 Cal. Rptr. 311, 314
(1967). "As an example, there is a sale on the comer of Seventh and Hope Street
that sold for $42 a foot, and there is another sale down at the comer of Ninth
and Hope Street that sold for $14 a foot."
24. Annot., 85 A.L.R.2d 110 (1962). California law is in accord with the
majority rule followed in other jurisdictions. ALR states that thirty-five jurisdic-
Washington University Open Scholarship
CASE COMMENTS
the decision creates several problems that possibly could have been
avoided by the court. In the first place, the better policy would be to
admit into evidence any sales which are even vaguely comparable when
there is a lack of actual comparables. The discretion of the trial
court should be exercised in the direction of admitting evidence rather
than excluding it. The jury is to weigh the evidence and decide the
value of the property; the trial court should allow any evidence that
may be helpful to go to the jury. In difficult situations like Henderson,
a restriction on the admissibility of evidence gives the jury even less
information on which to make a valuation.
Second, the view taken by the Henderson court would restrict the
comparable sales method of valuation to properties alike in every way.
This view is unrealistic when applied to property located within an
urban renewal project, because it does not take into account the re-
lationship between the project and the overall community plan. The
evidence in Henderson suggests that the urban renewal project area
would have developed commercially even if the renewal project had
not been undertaken, and the location of condemnee's property was
enough to indicate a probable shift in the zoning from residential to
commercial. The renewal project only expedited and organized this
change. While the future use of condemnee's property is not evidence
of its value, because the condemnee is not entitled to be awarded the
value of his property to the condemnor, in circumstances such as
Henderson the proposed future renewal use arguably has a bearing on
what comparables should be admitted as evidence of value.
These problems are complicated by some basic difficulties in the
determination of market values within an urban renewal area. In the
Henderson project, the redevelopment agency entered into the buying
process early, probably to avoid paying inflated prices for property
which might have increased in value as a result of urban renewal
project activity. Early acquisition of property within a project area is
typical, and is explicitly authorized by federal statute.25 Yet the fact
tions follow the majority rule and allow evidence of comparable sales in deter-
mining the market value of property. ALR also states that twenty-three of these
jurisdictions follow the rule in condemnation proceedings. Oregon and Hawaii
also follow the rule in condemnation proceedings. Of the jurisdictions which
allow evidence of comparable sales to determine market value, the majority allow
the trial court to use its discretion in deciding whether or not the evidence should
be admitted.
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1452(a) (1964). "In any case where, in connection with
its undertaking and carrying out of an urban renewal project, a local public
agency is authorized (under the circumstances in which the temporary loan herein
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that the redevelopment agency in Henderson entered into the buying
process early merely helped destroy the market for land within the
project area and thus complicated the problem of finding comparable
sales. The Henderson opinion states that there had been no sales
within the project area since 1957, except to the agency. If compar-
able sales are restricted to sales within the project area, only those
sales in which the redevelopment agency was a buyer would be avail-
able. These sales would all be forced sales which are not properly
admissible as comparables. Private sales occurring before 1957 inside
the project area could be used, but these sales would not meet the
"closeness in time" requirement of comparability.
On the other hand, if the project has been planned to encompass a
viable area, then no section of the city may contain property which is
comparable in kind to property included within the project. While
the problem may not be so difficult when the property to be con-
demned is unarguably residential, the issues are much more difficult
if it is alleged that the property is commercial property with special
characteristics. Even if commercial property comparable in character
to property within the project area can be found, the existence of
the project may, in turn, have artificially affected the real estate
market in other sections of the city. This result is especially likely if
the renewal project is extensive in area and critically located. Defla-
tionary and inflationary effects on property values will be especially
noticeable in areas adjacent to the project, which are the most likely
location for comparables.
Ill. CONCLUSION
Whether extending the use of comparable sales aids in solving these
problems of valuing property within an urban renewal area or simply
makes the problems more complex is hard to tell. But the problems
cannot be ignored, and the Henderson court, by refusing to consider
the effect of the project on the property in question, and on the
project area, and by making a rather arbitrary exclusion of compar-
ables, side-stepped the issues. The argument for not using compar-
ables at all in condemnation proceedings can be advanced on the
provided is requested) to acquire real property in the urban renewal areas, the
Administrator, in addition to all authority under this subchapter and notwith-
standing any other provisions of this subchapter, regardless of the stage of de.
velopment of the urban renewal plan and whether before or after the approval
thereof, mly make a temporary loan or loans to any such local public agency to
finance the acquisition of such real property. .. ."
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ground that comparables can not reflect market value because real
estate is unique. However, the California law is that they are to be
used, and they were used in Henderson. When comparables are used
they should be put to their best use, something not done in Henderson.
By its exclusion of all condemnee's comparables except one, the court
has relied solely on this one sale plus the several sales submitted by the
renewal authority. When market value is so hard to determine, the
court would have made a better decision by not so restricting the evi-
dence.
Peter W. Brown
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